As Erdogan attacks, where is Europe's voice?
Following an arrangement with Donald Trump, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has launched an invasion of the Northeast of Syria. It's an act that will do little for the prospects of peace in the region but which is already placing the lives of many Kurds, local to the area, in great danger. Having helped defeat and push back ISIS, Kurdish forces are now being rewarded by being left to the mercy of a Turkish assault.
But as this unfolds, what is Europe doing about it? For now, nothing. There is obvious concern and even outrage among European governments but very little in the way of action. Why is this? Because Europe's foreign policy tools are still locked away, kept out of reach by the individual vetoes of each national government.
When almost every government wanted the EU to collectively issue a statement warning Erdoğan of the dangers of this invasion into Syria - a fairly minimal show of resistance even then - Hungary decided to veto it. Europe was prevented from even issuing a condemnation because one government decided it was against the idea.
And for what? The traditional defence of the veto in European foreign policy is that national governments need it in order to properly defend the interests of their countries and their citizens. Now, we could take this argument seriously if the veto were deployed sparingly for truly existential matters. But the truth is that we see governments throw out vetoes on basically any foreign policy issue that they feel might inconvenience them. And the choice of language here is no accident, it is the government's own interests and priorities that are being defended here, not those of their countries or citizens. Or else, are we really supposed to believe that it would have been to the great detriment of Hungarian citizens for the EU to warn against Erdoğan's actions?
But - eurosceptics will tell us - limiting the scope of European foreign policy is essential in order to give national governments the freedom to pursue their own foreign policies. It is not a problem if European action fails due to national vetoes because national governments can simply act of their own accord. And yet where is this action? In the absence of a strong European voice, have we seen anything more than perhaps a patchwork of disjointed memos, swiftly blown away in the hurricane of the daily news cycle? The truth of the matter is that individual action by national governments can rarely substitute for an effective European foreign policy, for two reasons.
The first is simply one of scale. No matter how committed they may be to taking action, it is simply not possible for individual national governments to match the full power of the European Union. 27 is bigger than 1 - our individual strength cannot be greater than our collective strength. Even in circumstances where an individual state might have some notable capacity, like with the UK's military power, it is still self-evident that this will be less than if it had the backing of the rest of the EU. And as the scale falls, so does the influence and potential to impact the course of events in the world. Therefore the further we move away from European action and towards national policy alone, the less effective any decision becomes.
The second reason is that in the absence of European action, there is often no response at all. When European action fails, national governments often become less willing, not more, to engage. Why is this? It is precisely because in nearly all circumstances, national governments in Europe are under no illusions that it is worthwhile for them to act on their own. They know that for their actions to be meaningful, they need support from other states in Europe. But when this is not possible within the structures of the EU, they often conclude that it will not be possible at all. Sure, in theory you can act outside of these structures, and it does happen on occasion, but these are exceptions to the rule describing the declining voice of European countries in the world.
And in this scenario, any hope of relying on American might to bail out European indecision is looking forlorn. Not only has this crisis in part been caused by President Trump's actions, he has given little impression that he cares what the consequences for Europe will be. When asked about the potential for his actions to lead to ISIS fighters escaping from capture, Trump simply dismissed the concern by stating that these terrorists will be 'escaping to Europe'.
So faced with a White House that couldn't care less and crisis on our doorstep, it is once again made plain as day that we are in need of strategic autonomy of Europe, embodied in a real European foreign policy. To achieve this, we will need at least two rapid changes. First, the veto in foreign policy decisions will need to be scrapped. It is a device that has been abused in the name of narrow interests, an artefact from a previous time which does a disservice to the needs of European citizens as a whole. Second, it will be the task of Europe's incoming High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, to break with the previous orthodoxy of European foreign policy. Though Federica Mogherini was diligent in seeking consensus, this often led to a levelling down of ambition to the lowest common denominator. Instead Borrell must seek to lead and bring states on board with effective European action, not let the whole continent be dragged down by the most pessimistic and recalcitrant voices.
In the emerging world order, no one will defend our interests but ourselves. The strength to do so can only be found in European unity.
Image via Flickr
But as this unfolds, what is Europe doing about it? For now, nothing. There is obvious concern and even outrage among European governments but very little in the way of action. Why is this? Because Europe's foreign policy tools are still locked away, kept out of reach by the individual vetoes of each national government.
When almost every government wanted the EU to collectively issue a statement warning Erdoğan of the dangers of this invasion into Syria - a fairly minimal show of resistance even then - Hungary decided to veto it. Europe was prevented from even issuing a condemnation because one government decided it was against the idea.
And for what? The traditional defence of the veto in European foreign policy is that national governments need it in order to properly defend the interests of their countries and their citizens. Now, we could take this argument seriously if the veto were deployed sparingly for truly existential matters. But the truth is that we see governments throw out vetoes on basically any foreign policy issue that they feel might inconvenience them. And the choice of language here is no accident, it is the government's own interests and priorities that are being defended here, not those of their countries or citizens. Or else, are we really supposed to believe that it would have been to the great detriment of Hungarian citizens for the EU to warn against Erdoğan's actions?
But - eurosceptics will tell us - limiting the scope of European foreign policy is essential in order to give national governments the freedom to pursue their own foreign policies. It is not a problem if European action fails due to national vetoes because national governments can simply act of their own accord. And yet where is this action? In the absence of a strong European voice, have we seen anything more than perhaps a patchwork of disjointed memos, swiftly blown away in the hurricane of the daily news cycle? The truth of the matter is that individual action by national governments can rarely substitute for an effective European foreign policy, for two reasons.
The first is simply one of scale. No matter how committed they may be to taking action, it is simply not possible for individual national governments to match the full power of the European Union. 27 is bigger than 1 - our individual strength cannot be greater than our collective strength. Even in circumstances where an individual state might have some notable capacity, like with the UK's military power, it is still self-evident that this will be less than if it had the backing of the rest of the EU. And as the scale falls, so does the influence and potential to impact the course of events in the world. Therefore the further we move away from European action and towards national policy alone, the less effective any decision becomes.
The second reason is that in the absence of European action, there is often no response at all. When European action fails, national governments often become less willing, not more, to engage. Why is this? It is precisely because in nearly all circumstances, national governments in Europe are under no illusions that it is worthwhile for them to act on their own. They know that for their actions to be meaningful, they need support from other states in Europe. But when this is not possible within the structures of the EU, they often conclude that it will not be possible at all. Sure, in theory you can act outside of these structures, and it does happen on occasion, but these are exceptions to the rule describing the declining voice of European countries in the world.
And in this scenario, any hope of relying on American might to bail out European indecision is looking forlorn. Not only has this crisis in part been caused by President Trump's actions, he has given little impression that he cares what the consequences for Europe will be. When asked about the potential for his actions to lead to ISIS fighters escaping from capture, Trump simply dismissed the concern by stating that these terrorists will be 'escaping to Europe'.
So faced with a White House that couldn't care less and crisis on our doorstep, it is once again made plain as day that we are in need of strategic autonomy of Europe, embodied in a real European foreign policy. To achieve this, we will need at least two rapid changes. First, the veto in foreign policy decisions will need to be scrapped. It is a device that has been abused in the name of narrow interests, an artefact from a previous time which does a disservice to the needs of European citizens as a whole. Second, it will be the task of Europe's incoming High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, to break with the previous orthodoxy of European foreign policy. Though Federica Mogherini was diligent in seeking consensus, this often led to a levelling down of ambition to the lowest common denominator. Instead Borrell must seek to lead and bring states on board with effective European action, not let the whole continent be dragged down by the most pessimistic and recalcitrant voices.
In the emerging world order, no one will defend our interests but ourselves. The strength to do so can only be found in European unity.
Image via Flickr
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