Cameron's enemy was not UKIP but the hard-right Tories
David Cameron has announced that he is releasing his memoirs, with an initial interview in the media this weekend. So, fairly predictably, we are once again seein this story go around declaring that Cameron had no choice but to call the referendum in order to respond to the rise of UKIP. Public opnion was supposedly demanding a referendum and if Cameron did not agree to this demand, it would be more extreme forces who would benefit and take over.
The most important thing about this narrative? It's not even slightly true. When David Cameron made his promise of an in/out in January 2013, UKIP were only polling around 10% and very little in the way of proven electoral success (remember this was before the European Elections where they came first). UKIP was a problem for the Conservative Party, likely costing them marginal seats, but by no means did their presence demonstrate a sea-change within the wider British public.
What can be said for this narrative though, is that by blaming the rise of UKIP, attention is shifted onto an external force. Cameron is positioned as a mere helpless victim of some kind of force of nature - a simple man carried by the tides of history. This distracts from two realities: one, Cameron was not a mere stander-by - he was the Prime Minister and the course of events very much related to this personal decisions; and two, that the real problem was internal to the Conservative Party.
UKIP were certainly a nuissance and could cost the Conservatives a majority but what really drove the course of events was the ideological shift to the right within the Conservative Party - a growing presence of hard-right Nationalism that had reared its head again and again over the past few decades, rendering the party entirely dysfunctional when it came to Europe.
And so, as party leader, it was Cameron's responsibility to determine how to best deal with this growing faction. This was not an issue of public opinion but one of politics and party management.
Some might say that Cameron had no real choice here, that facing down the ERG faction of the Tories would have provoked a split in the Tory Party and doomed it to losing the next election (and maybe more). But we can immediately dispense with this idea by constrasting it to the Labour experience in dealing with Militant and other groups from the hard left. It was by no means pain free. It caused major problems within the party and arguably prevented it from winning some elections. But in the long-run the general view is that Labour was better off for having had the battle.
Just as Labour faced down Militant, so Cameron should have faced down the ERG. If that took a split, then a split is simply what Cameron should have accepted. The new centrist Tory Party would have struggled to beat Labour in the short-term but it would have very likely outperformed its hard-right counterpart and in the long-run would have been revived as a moderate centre-right party (likely on the model of the immensely successful German CDU). The party would likely have retained an element of Euroscepticism in all circumstances, but it would have avoided diving into the ideological soup of Nationalism. By contrast, the actual Tory Party of today is at a crossroads that could very easily lead to long-term destruction in the desperate quest for short-term gain.
Now some, of course, (including Cameron himself), argue that if he had not called a referendum, someone else would have and that someone could have been much more distinctly anti-EU. But would this have been such a great loss? Cameron was no great lover of the EU and has always really identified as a Eurosceptic - the fact that he felt it was incumbant on him to lead a campaign to stay in the EU was his own decision but not one that was ever clamoured for by the majority of pro-EU activists and politicians. To no one's great surprise, it resulted in a Remain campaign that had a distinctly detached approach - seemingly arguing only around the costs of leaving the EU (the part Cameron actually bought into) and with very little to say about the EU's benefits or what it represents in terms of emotion and identity (something Cameron has never demonstrated understanding in the slightest). We can only imagine what a Remain campaign led by someone who actually believed in the EU could have been like.
Unwilling to take the fight to his enemies within the Conservative Party and convinced of a future Eurosceptic bogeyman of his own making, it was therefore Cameron's decisions, often based on a tendency towards inaction, that drove him to conclude he had 'no choice'.
Seeking to preserve his party was a shallow justification for the pain and division that Cameron inflicted upon the country but even if we accept that this is a necessary objective for a party leader, what is perhaps most damning is that the strategy did not even work. The country is being led by people pushing for a No Deal Brexit, a more extreme position than anything considered possible, until recently, for a British Prime Minister and the Conservative Party is more split than ever, with dozens of MPs having defected, been kicked out or simply decided to quit, including some of the party's most high profile and experienced politicians.
And so, as Cameron's decisions have emerged to not only be poorly justified but to be the wrong ones anyway, many of us are left asking - what was this all for?
Image via Flickr
The most important thing about this narrative? It's not even slightly true. When David Cameron made his promise of an in/out in January 2013, UKIP were only polling around 10% and very little in the way of proven electoral success (remember this was before the European Elections where they came first). UKIP was a problem for the Conservative Party, likely costing them marginal seats, but by no means did their presence demonstrate a sea-change within the wider British public.
What can be said for this narrative though, is that by blaming the rise of UKIP, attention is shifted onto an external force. Cameron is positioned as a mere helpless victim of some kind of force of nature - a simple man carried by the tides of history. This distracts from two realities: one, Cameron was not a mere stander-by - he was the Prime Minister and the course of events very much related to this personal decisions; and two, that the real problem was internal to the Conservative Party.
UKIP were certainly a nuissance and could cost the Conservatives a majority but what really drove the course of events was the ideological shift to the right within the Conservative Party - a growing presence of hard-right Nationalism that had reared its head again and again over the past few decades, rendering the party entirely dysfunctional when it came to Europe.
And so, as party leader, it was Cameron's responsibility to determine how to best deal with this growing faction. This was not an issue of public opinion but one of politics and party management.
Some might say that Cameron had no real choice here, that facing down the ERG faction of the Tories would have provoked a split in the Tory Party and doomed it to losing the next election (and maybe more). But we can immediately dispense with this idea by constrasting it to the Labour experience in dealing with Militant and other groups from the hard left. It was by no means pain free. It caused major problems within the party and arguably prevented it from winning some elections. But in the long-run the general view is that Labour was better off for having had the battle.
Just as Labour faced down Militant, so Cameron should have faced down the ERG. If that took a split, then a split is simply what Cameron should have accepted. The new centrist Tory Party would have struggled to beat Labour in the short-term but it would have very likely outperformed its hard-right counterpart and in the long-run would have been revived as a moderate centre-right party (likely on the model of the immensely successful German CDU). The party would likely have retained an element of Euroscepticism in all circumstances, but it would have avoided diving into the ideological soup of Nationalism. By contrast, the actual Tory Party of today is at a crossroads that could very easily lead to long-term destruction in the desperate quest for short-term gain.
Now some, of course, (including Cameron himself), argue that if he had not called a referendum, someone else would have and that someone could have been much more distinctly anti-EU. But would this have been such a great loss? Cameron was no great lover of the EU and has always really identified as a Eurosceptic - the fact that he felt it was incumbant on him to lead a campaign to stay in the EU was his own decision but not one that was ever clamoured for by the majority of pro-EU activists and politicians. To no one's great surprise, it resulted in a Remain campaign that had a distinctly detached approach - seemingly arguing only around the costs of leaving the EU (the part Cameron actually bought into) and with very little to say about the EU's benefits or what it represents in terms of emotion and identity (something Cameron has never demonstrated understanding in the slightest). We can only imagine what a Remain campaign led by someone who actually believed in the EU could have been like.
Unwilling to take the fight to his enemies within the Conservative Party and convinced of a future Eurosceptic bogeyman of his own making, it was therefore Cameron's decisions, often based on a tendency towards inaction, that drove him to conclude he had 'no choice'.
Seeking to preserve his party was a shallow justification for the pain and division that Cameron inflicted upon the country but even if we accept that this is a necessary objective for a party leader, what is perhaps most damning is that the strategy did not even work. The country is being led by people pushing for a No Deal Brexit, a more extreme position than anything considered possible, until recently, for a British Prime Minister and the Conservative Party is more split than ever, with dozens of MPs having defected, been kicked out or simply decided to quit, including some of the party's most high profile and experienced politicians.
And so, as Cameron's decisions have emerged to not only be poorly justified but to be the wrong ones anyway, many of us are left asking - what was this all for?
Image via Flickr
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