Where we went wrong and what we can do better

Lots of people are putting out their assessments of what went wrong and what needs to be done next this weekend. In this spirit, I've put together my main thoughts on this issue, in the hope of contributing to the wider debate.

Let's start with the four main areas where problems have crystalised: division, aspiration, immigration and taxation.

Too divided

Let's start with the issue of division because it will also allow me to clarify a term that I'm going to keep using. 'Progressives' are a camp that I would define very broadly as encompassing everything from the centre to the left, along a Remain axis. And without a doubt in the 2019 election, progressives were too divided. Now, it's easy to fall into recriminations over whose fault this was (Corbyn's leadership, Liberal Democrats splitting the vote, purity-testing Remainers etc) but in the end who holds the most blame does not really matter: everyone was responsible to some degree. That division meant that dozens of seats were won by the Conservative candidate where the anti-Conservative vote was actually bigger. Remember, the Conservative vote hardly grew compared to 2017, it's simply the opposition camp that fractured to a much greater extent.

An awkward relationship with aspiration

Progressives still, for the most part, don't have much to say to the aspirational working class. The Blair years and the Conservative governments since have created a tendency to believe that the choice is either state intervention or no state at all. When progressives talk about state support, to many (including those among the working class), this simply sounds like state hand-outs and often they believe these are hand-outs for other people. The narrative of a state that, yes, supports those in hardship but which also helps the aspirational advance has been lost in the fear that to support aspiration would mean abandoning the fight against inequality or even actually endorsing inequality (Mandelson's assertion that 'we are intensely relaxed about people getting filthy rich' has left a deep scar and created misplaced suspicion).

Losing the argument on immigration

Now, readers unfamiliar with my previous articles may expect an anti-free movement declaration here. Indeed when progressives talk about failing to convince people on immigration, the 'cure' is often deemed to be simply apeing the positions of conservatives. However, this is not the point I want to make here. Rather, I want to draw attention to the way progressives have repeatedly failed to push back on the notion that abolishing EU freedom of movement is a way to make things better for non-EU migrants. While opponents of free movement have been successful in saying their primary concern was equality, progressives were unable to explain that this was a race to the bottom, where non-EU migrants would see little to no improvement in their status and where scapegoating of migrants would be increasingly normalised. Instead, far too often, what we saw was people pitting EU migrants against non-EU, trying to create 'gotcha' moments by pointing to the fact that there would be more non-EU citizens coming and that non-EU migration was up. In deploying these kinds of arguments, it was ironically relatively easy for conservatives to argue that they were the truly progressive ones. If EU Free Movement is allowed to be framed as a cost to non-EU migrants, then this is an argument we will keep losing.

Taxing the rich

Maybe you could implement significant spending increases without increasing taxes for most people. Maybe it's impossible. That debate is now fairly academic because what we know for sure is that too many voters believe it is impossible and are very unlikely to change their minds. And really can you blame them? It's a fairly incredible suggestion if the default assumption is that money is pretty limited. Ultimately we need to better acknowledge the tension between what we believe needs to be done and what a majority of voters can be convinced is possible. Soaking the rich does not meet this category and voters will continue to dismiss progressive economic programmes as long as this philosophy holds.

What can be done?

Naturally, this all paints a pretty bleak picture. But this does not mean we have no options and that nothing can be done. On the contrary, I believe we have pretty clear corrections we need to make.

On the issue of division, the structural issues are incredibly tough given the UK's electoral system. There is some attempt currently to organise people to join the Labour Party in order to ensure that the next leadership will be more unifying for the progressive camp. Being able to direct the course of the Labour ship in this way would certainly be the easiest solution. However, the leftward shift of the average party member since 2015 has been very significant and I don't think we should assume a couple months' worth of new members will be an automatic guarantee of success. With this in mind, we should also be considering a new progressive party, which could supersede progressives' old tribalisms (and potentially bridge the divide with Scotland in a way that our traditional parties are increasingly unable to do). Though talk of a new party may seem idealistic, this suggestion is actually borne of dry pragmatism. The obstacles for a new party are substantial but at this point it really does seem like the only way to unlock the progressive coalition.

On aspiration, not only do we need to broaden our policy offer to better include those who are in a tough situation but don't want to be reliant on the state, we need to fundamentally rethink our electoral coalition. In this regard, the most important thing is to look at our voter base as it exists today and not to get dragged into a debate about where the 'heartlands' used to be. Socially liberal working-class and middle-class voters, the young, graduates, women, pro-Europeans - these are all the demographics of the 'core' vote for the progressive movement in the UK today. The key challenge then is not simply to win over voters from other groups but also to do so in a way that doesn't alienate this new core (hence ideas around being more eurosceptic or socially conservative will fail to go very far). A big part of this will not just be convincing voters who are not naturally progressives but also convincing progressives who have moved over to the SNP and Plaid Cymru.

On immigration, attempts to 'catch out' Brexiteers on the basis that non-EU migration is going up need to stop immediately. First, it promotes the idea that this immigration is somehow bad, which does nothing to help the progressive cause. And second, it is always ineffective because conservatives don't tend to see themselves as people who oppose more non-EU migration anyway. What we should be doing is pushing an argument that is about delivering maximum freedom and autonomy to migrants looking to come to the UK. In the case of EU migrants, Freedom of Movement is a real possibility that has been successfully working for some decades. For non-EU migrants, that kind of freedom isn't politically possible yet but we shouldn't justify that by saying that non-EU migration is somehow bad. Inevitably the argument will come back that this is a recipe for large numbers of migrants but the truth is that's simply what our economy needs. Every study conducted comes to the same conclusion: that migration helps the UK economy, and what helps the UK economy also helps British citizens. Particularly in the case of 'low-skilled' migration, we need to beat back this narrative that somehow it is less important or helpful than other kinds of migration. We need people from across the skills spectrum and there's simply no evidence that abolishing Free Movement will lead to a better distribution of these skills. And while we may not be able to offer full Free Movement to non-EU migrants, challenging conservatives to ease up the requirements on acquiring citizenship and on family reunion rights would quickly demonstrate who the real progressives are.

And finally on tax, this is a challenge that we can take on as an opportunity. Whichever way you look at it, much of the UK debate on government spending has become detached from what actually makes sense. From harmful austerity on one end to uncosted spending promises on the other, there is plenty of leeway to convince voters with a programme that actually comes across as reasonable and pragmatic without being stingy or miserly. Over a number of decades, as politicians have continued to try to sell the idea of a low-tax, high-welfare state, the UK's tax base has become increasingly eroded - it's partly why the national debt is where it is and why so many of our public services are lacking in funding. The most important thing progressives can do therefore is to challenge the consensus that the public will never accept tax increases. People understand that high-quality public services need to be paid for. Suggesting a very modest increase in taxation for most (with a greater burden still falling on those earning more) would help correct the UK's budgetary situation, allow us to properly fund our public services and still be an entirely credible offering that few could dismiss out of hand.

Progressive lost this election badly but we shouldn't rush to assume that we can never recover. Progressives can win in the UK but a major overhaul of organisation and strategy is needed. Most importantly we need to be aware of our weaknesses and to understand the position we are in. Here I've sketched out what I feel are the most pressing points but the list is not exhaustive. In the end, we need to be ready to abandon old certainties, old comforts, and to move quickly to seize the opportunities before us as they come.


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