Virus crisis: return of the nation-state? Not so fast
The spread of coronavirus in Europe has led to a surge in state action. Measures that previously would have been seen as authoritarian or far-left have now become routine as cities or countries are put into lockdown, borders are closed and national budgets drained in order to guarantee people's wages. The nation-state as a provider to its citizens, with very direct trade-offs between security and freedom, has arguable not been so present in European society for two or three decades. By contrast, the EU has a relatively minor role in these events. It does not have competencies in health policy, which Member States have always wanted to retain at the national level, has limited fiscal capacity for stimulus and cannot control whether countries close their borders or not.
In this context, some have quickly jumped to the idea that Europe, as a layer of governance and political community, has broken down under the pressure of the crisis and that nation-states are back in the driving seat. This judgment seems hasty.
For one thing, we need to properly assess the context pre-crisis. Though nation-state governments are much more active and interventionist now than they have been previously, that previous absence wasn't due to Europe taking over. It was part of a general ideological predisposition towards a smaller role for the state and the public sector. Nation-states are not taking anything back from Europe because Europe was never in charge of these policies anyway. This is really a case of nation-states making use of powers they've always held - Europe's role has not actually changed.
Related to this, we have to appreciate the reality that, even inside the EU, nation-states have always been the main decision-makers. They hold all the major powers, can and do reject Commission proposals, define the way the EU works, what the EU can do, how much money the EU has. I've never liked the idea of talking about an EU 'executive' because this comparison to nation-states is always misleading - the EU doesn't function in the same way at all and is more like the UN or WTO than France or Italy. But if we were to speak of an EU 'executive', there's little doubt that it would be the Council (the meeting of Member State Ministers) and especially the European Council (bringing together the heads of Member State governments), where most decisions are actually made.
So when we talk about a revived nation-state, especially in relation to the power and role of the EU, we have to be very careful not to exaggerate what the situation was before the crisis hit.
Once we get that misconception out of the way, we actually open up some very different conclusions on what the crisis might mean for the future of Europe. Whereas on the former narrative, the actions of nation-states lead to the belief that Europe's role is declining, if we recognise where the EU actually was to start with, we can see quite clearly how the EU is both meeting expectations, within its available powers, and has the possibility to advance integration in the future.
First, on economic support. The EU can't do much in terms of fiscal capacity but Member States can and here the Commission has taken appropriate action to give EU states as much flexibility as possible. Not only has it put together a new, more generous framework on state aid for the rest of this year, it has also proposed that the Council should approve suspending the Stability and Growth Pact, ensuring that states can spend without being constrained by deficit limits. Then on monetary policy, after some misplaced communication, the ECB has stepped up and promised €750bn in bond buying, assuring markets it would keep going for as long as necessary to whether the crisis - a move which immediately helped troubled countries like Italy. It is likely we have yet to see the end of these measures and discussions around 'coronabonds' - eurobonds issued specifically for the duration of the crisis - are not going away. There's still scope for more Europe here.
Second, coordinating border controls. It wasn't long after the initial flurry of unilateral measures that Member States asked the Commission to present ideas for coordinating the border controls of EU states. Though there is nothing the Commission can legally do as emergencies allow Member States to impose full border restrictions, the Commission did suggest an EU-wide restriction on movement from outside the EU, in order to alleviate pressure on internal borders. This was widely taken up, the only notable exception being the UK and therefore Ireland (who had to align with the UK decision to keep the border open with Northern Ireland). When the crisis abates and borders move back to normal, would it be so surprising if the internal EU borders were relaxed first? And from here, would we not have a de facto common EU external and internal migration policy? It's at least a possibility.
Third, directing essential supplies. To ensure that all countries have access to the necessary medical supplies, as much as possible, the EU has started stockpiling a central reserve. This is the first time such a stockpile has been put together and will be nearly entirely financed by the EU. From this stockpile, Member States can apply for supplies, including ventilators and face masks, which will then be directed based on need. It seems likely that such emergency coordination of supplies, along with initiatives for joint procurement, will become more established in the future.
Fourth, spontaneous European solidarity. The rush to close borders across Europe has done something rather important. It has very quickly shown how much of a problem these borders are, even in a pandemic. Having put up the controls, countries are now going in the opposite direction, creating exemptions for cross-border workers, opening up special fast lanes for goods trade and especially for medical supplies. The German state of North-Rhine Westphalia is coordinating with neighbouring Netherlands on a coronavirus taskforce. Bade-Wutternberg, which border one of France's worst-hit regions, is opening up hospital capacity for French citizens. Germany has also sent a shipment of medical equipment to Italy in recent days. Export controls on medical equipment, hastily imposed, are now being lifted for intra-EU trade. It's far from true to say that European solidarity is absent in this time of crisis.
Of course nation-states are playing a big role today - what else would anyone expect in a crisis? The EU is a highly integrated area but it's still a group of sovereign nation-states who will behave exactly as you would expect sovereign nation-states to. But it's too much to imagine that this marks a nationalist revival. It is entirely true to say that in the face of crisis, Europeans can see just how reliant we are on each other, how easily problems in one state can matter to all of us, and how much we need coordinated responses.
This could well be what Robert Schuman envisaged when he said on 9th May 1950: 'Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.'
Image via Flickr
In this context, some have quickly jumped to the idea that Europe, as a layer of governance and political community, has broken down under the pressure of the crisis and that nation-states are back in the driving seat. This judgment seems hasty.
For one thing, we need to properly assess the context pre-crisis. Though nation-state governments are much more active and interventionist now than they have been previously, that previous absence wasn't due to Europe taking over. It was part of a general ideological predisposition towards a smaller role for the state and the public sector. Nation-states are not taking anything back from Europe because Europe was never in charge of these policies anyway. This is really a case of nation-states making use of powers they've always held - Europe's role has not actually changed.
Related to this, we have to appreciate the reality that, even inside the EU, nation-states have always been the main decision-makers. They hold all the major powers, can and do reject Commission proposals, define the way the EU works, what the EU can do, how much money the EU has. I've never liked the idea of talking about an EU 'executive' because this comparison to nation-states is always misleading - the EU doesn't function in the same way at all and is more like the UN or WTO than France or Italy. But if we were to speak of an EU 'executive', there's little doubt that it would be the Council (the meeting of Member State Ministers) and especially the European Council (bringing together the heads of Member State governments), where most decisions are actually made.
So when we talk about a revived nation-state, especially in relation to the power and role of the EU, we have to be very careful not to exaggerate what the situation was before the crisis hit.
Once we get that misconception out of the way, we actually open up some very different conclusions on what the crisis might mean for the future of Europe. Whereas on the former narrative, the actions of nation-states lead to the belief that Europe's role is declining, if we recognise where the EU actually was to start with, we can see quite clearly how the EU is both meeting expectations, within its available powers, and has the possibility to advance integration in the future.
First, on economic support. The EU can't do much in terms of fiscal capacity but Member States can and here the Commission has taken appropriate action to give EU states as much flexibility as possible. Not only has it put together a new, more generous framework on state aid for the rest of this year, it has also proposed that the Council should approve suspending the Stability and Growth Pact, ensuring that states can spend without being constrained by deficit limits. Then on monetary policy, after some misplaced communication, the ECB has stepped up and promised €750bn in bond buying, assuring markets it would keep going for as long as necessary to whether the crisis - a move which immediately helped troubled countries like Italy. It is likely we have yet to see the end of these measures and discussions around 'coronabonds' - eurobonds issued specifically for the duration of the crisis - are not going away. There's still scope for more Europe here.
Second, coordinating border controls. It wasn't long after the initial flurry of unilateral measures that Member States asked the Commission to present ideas for coordinating the border controls of EU states. Though there is nothing the Commission can legally do as emergencies allow Member States to impose full border restrictions, the Commission did suggest an EU-wide restriction on movement from outside the EU, in order to alleviate pressure on internal borders. This was widely taken up, the only notable exception being the UK and therefore Ireland (who had to align with the UK decision to keep the border open with Northern Ireland). When the crisis abates and borders move back to normal, would it be so surprising if the internal EU borders were relaxed first? And from here, would we not have a de facto common EU external and internal migration policy? It's at least a possibility.
Third, directing essential supplies. To ensure that all countries have access to the necessary medical supplies, as much as possible, the EU has started stockpiling a central reserve. This is the first time such a stockpile has been put together and will be nearly entirely financed by the EU. From this stockpile, Member States can apply for supplies, including ventilators and face masks, which will then be directed based on need. It seems likely that such emergency coordination of supplies, along with initiatives for joint procurement, will become more established in the future.
Fourth, spontaneous European solidarity. The rush to close borders across Europe has done something rather important. It has very quickly shown how much of a problem these borders are, even in a pandemic. Having put up the controls, countries are now going in the opposite direction, creating exemptions for cross-border workers, opening up special fast lanes for goods trade and especially for medical supplies. The German state of North-Rhine Westphalia is coordinating with neighbouring Netherlands on a coronavirus taskforce. Bade-Wutternberg, which border one of France's worst-hit regions, is opening up hospital capacity for French citizens. Germany has also sent a shipment of medical equipment to Italy in recent days. Export controls on medical equipment, hastily imposed, are now being lifted for intra-EU trade. It's far from true to say that European solidarity is absent in this time of crisis.
Of course nation-states are playing a big role today - what else would anyone expect in a crisis? The EU is a highly integrated area but it's still a group of sovereign nation-states who will behave exactly as you would expect sovereign nation-states to. But it's too much to imagine that this marks a nationalist revival. It is entirely true to say that in the face of crisis, Europeans can see just how reliant we are on each other, how easily problems in one state can matter to all of us, and how much we need coordinated responses.
This could well be what Robert Schuman envisaged when he said on 9th May 1950: 'Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.'
Image via Flickr
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