Loyalty is not rewarded

One of the strangest alliances of the past few years in UK politics has been the one forged between Northern Irish unionists and English nationalists. After all, surely for Northern Irish unionist, among the most hardline and pro-Westminster unionists in the UK, there is little sense in joining forces with those whose main concern is the future and place of England?

In some ways, this alliance may be less surprising than it might at first seem. In spite of the contradiction, there are some surface similarities that have brought Northern Irish unionists into the arms of English nationalists. Both groups are primarily conservative in their political disposition. Though the English nationalists had been moving away on various aspects of social policy (gay marriage, abortion), the recent bout of culture wars, the desire to push back against critical assessments of the UK and its past, has provided a sufficiently broad brush to cover up the cracks that had been appearing in their different ideas of 21st-century conservatism. Creationism, and other views that wouldn't be given the time of day in England, can be overlooked and attention shifted onto the defence of statues of slave-traders. 

They are also both obviously pro-Brexit. The anti-EU sentiment of Northern Irish unionists (or at least their political representatives) has often been intense and, in that sense, the expansion of English nationalism into the English political mainstream has been a game of catch-up for the English. Now both sides of the Irish sea have large parties representing significant constituencies who are totally opposed to good relations with the EU and reject any kind of association or partnership beyond the minimum of necessary economic exchange. The fact that much of UK politics has been defined by the question of Brexit undoubtedly provided a cement to bind the Northern Irish unionists and English nationalists together. 

And yet Brexit has also demonstrated the limits of that relationship. The place of Northern Ireland proved to be major roadblock to the ambitions of many in London for a 'clean break' between the UK and the EU. As some had warned during the referendum, the situation in Northern Ireland was anything but clean. Anxieties over wrecking the peace agreement as a result of a return to hard borders between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland were high in the minds of politicians and negotiators on both sides. It quickly became obvious that something would have to give: either the UK as a whole would have to soften its approach to Brexit or Northern Ireland would need some kind of special arrangement to treat it differently from the rest of the UK. Theresa May chose the former - she was ejected from office by her own party. Boris Johnson chose the latter - he won a substantial majority, claiming parts of England that his party had not held for decades. 

And while Northern Irish unionists are now arguing that Johnson's deal is unacceptable, through the negotiations themselves, they repeatedly backed the most hardline forms of Brexit. Why? 

Unlike other parts of the UK, Northern Irish unionism goes to great lengths to show that it is truly British. Even Scottish unionists, faced with years of government by Scottish nationalists, do not demonstrate this need to prove themselves. But Northern Ireland is different and Brexit presented itself as a symbol of Britishness. The more pro-Brexit you were, the more patriotic you were - this was the message that came from Westminster. Though they had arrived at the anti-EU party late, English nationalists were the ones who set the bar and Northern Irish unionist could only jump to meet it. 

In this sense, English nationalists have spent much of the past few years forcing Northern Irish unionists into hardline positions (though to be clear, this was no great trial for the latter). And even as some might have suspected that Westminster would hold to this position, would eventually sell out Northern Ireland, what else could they do? 

This is the true tragedy of Northern Irish unionism. It would not be the first time in history that their preferences have been put aside by a Westminster government seeking other objectives. Arguably it has been written into Northern Ireland's history since its birth. But this is the way it must be. If the Northern Irish unionists were to actually break from Westminster, where else would they turn?

The logical conclusion then would be that Northern Irish unionism is doomed - given spurts of attention by its seeming allies in Westminster but ultimately bumped down to second place if it becomes a block to other interests dearer to the heart of England. 

Doomed, unless Northern Irish unionism can make one important change. It could break this evidently unhelpful relationship if it could reimagine its unionism and Britishness, severing both of them from Westminster. 

There are three ways this could take form. First, separating the interests of Northern Ireland (and the unionist community in particular) from the interests of England or the UK as a whole and recognising that they are not always the same. Even when those in Westminster might be superficially speaking the same words, this is often only a tactical decision to serve other interests, an instrumentalisation of Northern Ireland's unionists in order to apply pressure elsewhere. 

Second, and following from the first point, engaging with the rest of unionist politics outside of Westminster. The politicians of the UK parliament and attending journalists do not hold a monopoly on unionism and investing all their efforts in this one small group has not served Northern Irish unionism well. Far better to also build links and to find allies with the other administrations in Cardiff and Edinburgh. Unionism can only succeed as an interconnected web with lines running across the different parts of the UK. The 'all roads lead to London' view has not worked and will not work.

Third, Northern Irish unionism should look for more allies closer to home. Having set out a vision of Northern Irish interests and begun a process of building ties across the UK, Northern Irish unionists should combine these two approaches in Northern Ireland itself. This could mean more collaboration with non-aligned groups and it could even mean working better with the nationalist community. How different things might have been if unionists and nationalists had built a common position post-2016 rejecting both North-South and East-West borders. To have had Northern Ireland speak with one voice could have forced both sides of the Brexit negotiations to sign up to this dual approach and done so much more to defend the interests of Northern Irish unionism. 

For Northern Irish unionists, this third point would likely have meant a compromise on Brexit. The three changes taken together may require a compromise on their conservatism. But this is the choice to be made - is the union really the thing they value most?

In other words, to prosper, Northern Irish unionism should learn that loyalty is not rewarded, and act accordingly.