A year of Brexit

At midnight, on 31st December 2020, EU law ceased to have effect in the UK. The transition period had ended and Brexit was 'done'. The 'oven-ready' withdrawal deal and the barebones trade agreement both came into effect. The first year of Brexit had begun.

What a nightmare it has been.

To the surprise of some and the jubilation of others, Brexit got off to a running start at the beginning of the year. Newspapers lauded the fact the UK approved and rolled out new COVID-19 vaccines earlier than other European countries. There was much talk of the UK powering ahead, reaping great economic gains thanks to its early lead. It seemed like the UK jetski really would outmanoeuvre the EU supertanker.

This rhetoric was dialled down when we fumbled the following wave of the pandemic. And the one after that. Our vaccination efforts stalled and others caught up. By the summer we were no longer leading in Europe. By the winter, we were lagging behind most of our Western European peers in second doses. In economic terms, the OECD estimates that the UK has performed worst among the G7 over the past two years. 

In the space of a few months, the ostensible advantages of Brexit - adaptable regulators and bountiful vaccine supply - evaporated.

In approving vaccines for teens and then for children, it is our national regulator which has been ponderous, the EU acting earlier in both cases. And while the UK and the EU have both guaranteed domestic vaccine supply, the UK has had to be much more miserly. We have fallen well behind in donations to the international vaccination body, COVAX (actual donations are 20.2 million doses from the UK, compared to 99.1 million from Germany, 64.1 million from France, 46.3 million from Spain and 43.9 million from Italy).

And that's the good news.

Overwhelmingly, the story of Year One of Brexit has been a tale of economic drag - an anchor to the British ship. 

A raft of Brexit bureaucracy has now hit UK business. Outside of the EU Single Market and Customs Union, businesses face a multiplication of forms and procedures. New border checks add time and costs to EU-UK trade. Checks that will only become more onerous once they are implemented in full from next year. 

There are also new bans and limits on what can move across the border. Even approval processes, demonstrating goods meet the correct standards, are now duplicated in many areas. To sell in the UK and EU markets, businesses must register with both UK and EU bodies, going through separate procedures in each case.

The evidence of this Brexit weight is easy to find. Pick up any number of consumer goods and you have long been able to see a 'CE' mark. This is the certificate demonstrating that a good has met the standards of the Single Market. In Brexit Britain you may have noticed goods being sold with both a CE and a 'UKCA' mark. The UKCA mark does exactly the same thing but is only useful for the UK market. For politicians, UKCA is a political statement, a visible manifestation of Brexit. For employers, it is a pointless handicap.

Is it any wonder the Office for Budget Responsibility expects our long-term GDP will be 4% lower thanks to leaving the EU?

All this added paperwork, these new barriers between the UK and the rest of Europe, has had consequences beyond just increased costs. Shortages have been one of the leitmotifs of life in Britain this year. 

Now, yes, it's true, supply chains have been disrupted around the world. Yet Brits have had a tougher time of it than our neighbours. Whether food, fuel or workers, shortages have battered this country in 2021. 

Recent polling found that in recent weeks 56% of people had had direct experience of food products not being available in the shops. This is drastically higher than in other comparable countries (Germany 18%, France 16%, Spain 7%, Italy 6%). 

The same is true of fuel. 33% of Brits reported personally dealing with a shortage of fuel in recent weeks. No other country got above 10%.

There are two potential explanations for this difference. Either these particular countries are exceptionally well protected from the global disruption produced by the pandemic. Or the malaise affecting supply chains which deliver goods to the UK is more than a bad case of COVID-19. 

Likewise, the decision to sever the UK from EU Freedom of Movement has had unsurprising consequences. It is now common to hear of industries complaining that they cannot get the workers they need, leading to production shortfalls or worse. 

We were supposed to be take control of our borders, allowing in only the immigrants that were really necessary. But labour shortages have underlined the failure of this 'points-based', 'Australian-style' immigration system. Targeted visa schemes for butchers, truck drivers and scientists have all floundered. Faced with a country celebrating the end of openness and reciprocal rights, many are choosing to find work elsewhere.

These losses paint a grim picture but what about Brexit opportunities, specifically the new trade deals? Back in 2016, Brexiteers assured us that any cost from being out of the EU would be more than compensated by a raft of exciting new trade deals with growing markets. 

It's true, we do have a large number of trade deals. However, these are nearly all copies of the deals we had as part of the EU. By definition, they add no new value.

And new, groundbreaking deals? There are two - New Zealand and Australia - and they are worth little and less. The government's own analysis shows they will add only a tiny fraction to our economic growth (around 0.01% from the first and 0.08% from the second). Further, certain important sectors are likely to lose out, hitting UK businesses. British farming is one example. The free trade deal with Australia will cost our agriculture sector £94m, on current estimates. The National Farmers Union sees the deal with New Zealand in similarly grim terms, noting it secures "almost nothing in return for UK farmers". What Brexiteers wrongly accused the EU of doing to fishing, Brexit will actually do to our farming.

Even for the winners, the gains from new deals are meager at best. We would need dozens more such deals with wealthy countries to make up for the loss from Brexit. 

Brexiteers complain we're not grasping the opportunities of Brexit. The real problem is they don't exist.

So Brexit's first year has been an economic failure, but then there's more to life than money. Is there any better news on the political front? What about our relations with other countries? Brexit was supposed to put the UK front and centre of the global network. 

We are far away from that promise today.

Brexiteers promised us that being outside the EU would improve our relations with our neighbours. No longer part of European political structures, we could have arms-length, but happy, economic relations.  Now the political side is gone, can anyone say that relations have improved between London and Paris, or London and Dublin? Or indeed, with any nearby state? In truth, our closest bonds and alliances are in a worse state than almost anyone can remember.

European integration dissolved causes for difference and gave us chances to improve understanding. Brexit has made all issues, great (the border in Northern Ireland) and small (a handful of fishing licenses in the Channel), into heated battles. 

Going into 2022, we see no end in sight for the difficult negotiations around the Northern Ireland Protocol. Either the tensions will continue to rise or the UK government will have to give way on some of its demands. It is likely in either case that the dispute will poison relations further between us and the rest of Europe.

And as the disputes with our neighbours grind on, the remants of our soft power are being slashed and burned.

2021 could have been the showcase year for Global Britain. By chance, the UK held the presidencies of both the G7 and COP26. This put us at the centre of international affairs for an unusually long time. The UK, detached from the EU, was meant to operate as a global deal broker, guiding different sides towards the best outcomes.

But, presented with this opportunity, Brexiteers fumbled the ball. On the key issue of the day - climate change - the results fell well below expectations and the disappointment was visible. 

The UK's 'special relationship' with the US was unable to deliver a G7 commitment on phasing out coal power. This made a similar failure at COP26 almost inevitable. The climate conference itself was marred by access problems - vaccine inequality, messy security protocols, cumbersome health precautions, extortionate lodging and visa issues. 

The UK tried to coast by on reputation and an assumption of authority. But the double G7/COP26 presidency highlighted the limits, not the extent, of Brexit Britain's influence. No wheeling-dealing global might ready to lead the free world. Only a hobbled state, caught between the EU/China/US trio.

And post-Brexit policies are set to cut down our position further.

Now out of the European scheme for student exchanges, Erasmus, we have set up a new scheme - Turing. The Turing programme has less funding and leaves universities facing much more administration. To save a few more pennies, the British Council, the natural organisation with the experience, networks and focus to deliver Turing, has been undercut by outsourcing firm, Capita. A weak replacement run for the purposes of private profit, the new Brexit scheme will put our soft power at risk as networks fail to develop. 

Wider budget cuts suggest this mindset will be endemic to Brexit Britain, not an anomaly of the exchange programme. The foreign aid budget has already been squeezed, down to 0.5% of GDP, and there are plans to cut the Foreign Office's staff by 20% over the next four years. 

In short, trade is down, businesses are hurting and our international relations are weakened. Just one plank of the Brexiteer promise is therefore still left standing: parliamentary sovereignty. 

What can be said of our great and velnerable Parliament?

Sadly, very little of worth.

Far from enhancing its power, Brexit has been an instrument to gut our Parliament. More and more, the Brexit government has preferred to make use of executive powers. 

Where once, the EU acted as a check on government power, now the executive is hoarding all it can. Ministers change the law as and when they feel fit, without recourse to Parliament. 'Skeleton laws', pieces of legislation where the government fills in the gaps at a later date, are increasingly common. And where laws are put to our elected MPs, they are often rammed through on tight timetables, the government using its one-party majority to override any concerns.

It's a trend that began under the Brexit process. The government took almost full powers in delivering Brexit, including changes to domestic laws. The final Brexit withdrawal deal and the EU-UK trade agreement had little scrutiny before MPs gave their approval. 

The evidence suggests the government has every intention of continuing down this path. In the pandemic the government has often used similar tactics to pass important restrictions on people's rights. Naturally emergency powers have their place but the government uses them with little scrutiny or limit in the UK. Outside of the health situation, the government is acting in other areas to give itself more power - with plans to strike out court judgments it dislikes, curb the right to protest or make it easier to take someone's citizenship.

In ranking Brexit's failures, the idea that Parliament would gain greater sovereignty may be one of the greatest.

Finally, it's worth thinking about the EU itself. Is the other side of the Brexit decision forlorn? Spiteful? Heartbroken? Vengeful? Are they suffering the same problems we are? Does Brexit also still infect their politics as it does ours?

Truthfully, the EU has moved on. Unless you are one of a few officials in Brussels or in national capitals, Brexit is not on your agenda anymore. EU businesses are recouping the extra costs by charging more to their UK counterparts or are simply finding new partners. Most EU citizens have sympathy for the UK's travails but little desire to join us.

The EU is looking to its future. Outside of the time spent fighting the pandemic, the EU has made big progress with its Green Deal. New plans are advancing to expand the use of carbon pricing, to level the playing field for polluting imports, to encourage the switch to electric vehicles, to accelerate the roll-out of renewable energy and to green the financial sector. 

Meanwhile, the post-pandemic Recovery Fund is getting underway, launching a multi-year programme of reforms and investments across the EU. Powered by common EU borrowing, the Fund will deliver hundreds of billions in investments to green and digitalise EU economies, with the rest of the spending allocated according to national priorities. To ensure the money is used well, countries will simultaneously deliver ambitious reform plans. These plans, drawn up by national governments, will aim to get rid of unnecessary bureaucracy and encourage employment, investment and growth. 

Forget the Brexit boosterism. It is the EU states which are seizing the real opportunities to step into the next generation of economic strength.

It has been one year of Brexit. On this evidence, a return to our seat at the heart of Europe cannot come too soon.

Image via Flickr