Brexit after Frost

A vacancy has appeared at the top of the UK government. But unusually for such an important post, it is not obvious whether the Prime Minister should fill it - and if he does, what kind of person he should give the job to. 

The answer largely depends on what it is that Johnson wants to do next. To my mind, there are three major avenues now open.

Placating the hardline Brexiteers

The first option is essentially continuity. Johnson could pick another hardliner like Frost from the furthest right flank of the Tory backbenches (Iain Duncan Smith, for example, is a name that has been suggested on social media). They would, given some time, return to the task of dismantling the Northern Ireland Protocol and would take a confrontational approach with the EU. 

For Johnson this would all be about throwing some red meat to the restless backbenchers, wary of the fate that befell his predecessor, Theresa May. 

It would not be a permanent solution, however. It is unlikely that anyone else would have better luck than Frost in demanding the EU give something they have no intention to give. Sooner or later Johnson would have to return to the question of whether he really wants to provoke a trade war with the EU. If he doesn't then either his new Brexit negotiator will resign, as Frost has done, or they will all collectively fold and admit that the terms of the Protocol are largely tied to Brexit now. 

After further turmoil and tensions, Johnson would simply have brought us back to where we were at the start of this week, though he will have kept his party behind him in the meantime. 

Hurting a rival

The second option is to exploit the impossibility of the Brexit challenge to damage the reputation of one of his competitors - those colleagues waiting to take over should Johnson's career come to an early end. 

Liz Truss is such an individual. She has had a number of Brexit wins thanks to her previous position in charge of international trade - trade partners were largely happy to roll over the previous terms of the EU trade deals and so these were replicated in new continuity agreements. Truss was able to brand herself as an ambassador for 'Global Britain' with few real obstacles and has become a favourite of party members. This has also made her a favourite to succeed the Prime Minister and her rising star could convince MPs that Johnson, the man who won Brexit and the 2019 election, isn't really all that necessary.

As Foreign Secretary, it would be easy to justify shifting Brexit duties over to Truss (from an organisational perspective, this may just be a good idea in itself) and Truss would also be able to keep the hardliners onside. 

Notably, by insisting that she try and continue Frost's mission, Johnson would be handing over a poisoned chalice. Truss would, like all Brexiteers who reach positions of power, be forced to contend with difficult trade-offs and decisions which could be unpopular with the party base. Her reputation could suffer and her popularity as a replacement for Johnson could fall. 

It may be that she too would decide that it is better to take the plunge and resign than to admit that Brexit can't be everything that was promised. This could be dangerous for Johnson and could be the final step that truly unravels his premiership. 

But it seems unlikely that languishing on the backbenches is what Truss really wants. To avoid being left in the oubliette, she would need to be confident that her resignation would be backed up by a flood of no confidence letters, a notoriously tricky thing to guarantee. With a following wind, Johnson could make a potential rival carry the can for the problems of Brexit.

Improving relations with the EU

The third option is to make the Brexit job into something new entirely - not a job about making Brexit a success but about making our relations with the EU a success.

In this scenario, Brexit would be 'done'. Not everything we do as a country would need to be defined by whether it contributes to Brexit, whether it justifies Brexit as having been worthwhile. Importantly, Brexit would be taken out of our relations with the EU. Our relationship with our biggest economic and political partner and with all of our neighbours would be justified on its own basis, on whether it delivered benefits to us, not on whether it betrays or conforms to the spirit of Brexit. 

In this scenario, the UK would enjoy a more stable and more productive relationship with the EU. We could even look to repair some of the damage that was done in the initial rush of zealotry (such as the needless withdrawal from the highly effective Erasmus student exchange scheme). Without the distraction of confected fights with the EU, we could also give more time and attention to the actual domestic problems (like fixing healthcare or policing). 

This could be given to an existing senior minister (like Truss), a proper senior Minister for Europe could be created (currently there is only the Minister for Europe and Americas - a somewhat broad remit) or the lead on relations with the EU could be given to a senior official, with no ministerial role.

The last option could make EU relations easier by virtue of depoliticising them but that would be a second-best compared to a positive, but nonetheless still politically important, agenda led by a senior minister. 

However, for Johnson this may be the only version possible. The simple fact is that the more political relations with the EU are, the more likely it is that Johnson will have to contend with the hardline anti-EU sentiment in his party. Indeed, even giving the role to an official and minimising its importance may not be enough to prevent the Tories from splitting over Europe. 

While it is the best avenue for the UK politically and economically, the more positive approach will also be the hardest for Johnson to sell to his backbenchers. He would need to keep the EU off their minds, otherwise Johnson would likely be replaced by another preacher of the Brexit creed.