Has power in Europe shifted eastwards?

In his recent piece in the New Statesman, Jeremy Cliffe sets out the case for why Europe's political centre of gravity is shifting eastwards. 

In essence, nothing in the piece is wrong. As set out, the argument is fair and accurate - CEE countries have taken a leading role in the response to the war in Ukraine, NATO and the EU are both attracting members on Europe's Eastern edge and there is a process of economic convergence. Most of all, there is no dispute on the idea that Ukraine has become the symbol of European values (as presented in this blog here, in the days following the February invasion). 

Cliffe does recognise that some governments in Eastern Europe are not using their influence to its full potential, citing Poland and its decision to undermine the rule of law at home, dragging it into regular conflicts with others in Europe and with the EU institutions. Yet while presented as a caveat, this simply tends to reinforce the main argument: 'imagine how much clearer the eastward shift would be if Poland wasn't run by hard right populists'. 

But while nothing is factually incorrect, there is still a wider context that is missing. Presented with that context, the shift in Europe's balance of power is considerably less dramatic. 

There are three key points.

First, on leading the response to the war in Ukraine. It's true that CEE countries have played a big role here. Compared to past crises, which were very much focused on Western and Southern Europe and their governments, Poland and the Baltics have driven forward the EU response and support for Ukraine in a way that France, Germany and Italy simply have not. 

Yet it would be difficult to ignore the fact that two other actors in Europe have also played an important part in pushing for an active approach to helping Ukraine win the war: the UK and the European Commission. The UK is not in the EU but nonetheless, when it is active in European affairs, as it has been with Ukraine, then it surely contributes to holding the balance of power closer to the West. 

The European Commission meanwhile has been just as hawkish on Russia as any number of CEE countries. Where those countries wanted to put forward ideas and initiatives, on Russian sanctions for example, the Commission was only too happy to take them up and quickly turn them into legislative proposals that the EU's national governments could then collectively approve. If you want to see how differently things can turn out when the Commission is dragging its heels, just take a look at the state of the debate on a gas price cap. 

Germany and France have a track record in being able to strong arm the Commission to take a certain position, thanks to their deep political connections and substantial financial muscle - it's not nearly so obvious that the CEE group has this same ability. 

And as the discussion is focused on the European balance of power, the US is left out here, but it is also worth asking how far the CEE countries would have got without the US implicitly supporting their arguments from the outside. Indeed, where the US is diverging from the hawkish position of CEE countries (such as on the Russian oil price cap), the influence of the latter seems to drop off. 

Second, there's more to policy-making in Europe than just the war in Ukraine. Overwhelmingly the argument in favour of an eastward shift rests on an (accurate) account of how different actors have played their roles in Europe's response to today's major crisis. Yet even without the caveats above on how solid that CEE influence in the war really is, it would be premature to determine that the whole centre of political gravity in Europe has shifted on this basis alone. 

That's not to say it might not do so in the future but there is not enough evidence to say this is the case today. In practice, when looking at the broad spectrum of policy-making in Europe, it's difficult to escape the conclusion that Western Europe, and in particular the Franco-German partnership, isn't crucially important for breaking deadlocks and forging new initiatives. More fiscal strength from the EU will still require Germany to recognise the necessity of more joint borrowing (and drag the other 'frugal' countries along with it). Action on climate change is still led by Western Europe and the Nordics, working against a recalcitrant CEE. And Europe's international diplomacy, whether united or divided, still largely depends on the actions of Western European governments. 

Third, membership applications are a long way from actual membership. Maybe one day the EU will have grown to 30+ member states and welcomed many millions more Eastern Europeans as citizens (the overwhelming majority of whom would be Ukrainians). But that is not today and few even think that it will happen any time soon.  

So while there is an opening to the East, thanks to the granting of candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, they are only joining a group of countries in Eastern Europe that are struggling to make their way into the EU and to the heart of its institutions. Even current members, already inside the EU, like Bulgaria and Romania, find their desire to integrate further and join the Schengen area repeatedly blocked by Western European vetoes. And this is without even mentioning the fact that Georgia's application to be a candidate for membership was actually turned down. 

In the end perhaps it is not wrong to say that the balance of power is shifting eastwards. But such sentiment should be balanced by a recognition of just how firmly the status quo is lodged in the Western half of Europe. A shift eastwards, as may be taking place today, may not even reach Europe's centre, let alone tip the balance towards the East itself.